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The fact that 3) was not built-in from the start pains me to no end. It should be flying first-class with Priority Airlines, a penthouse in the Hilton bugtracker since 1996. Instead, it's #3 in someone's list somewhere in a forum in 2015.


AFAIK it was built-in from the start, as far as the X.509 protocol is concerned. Its just not used anywhere.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10


Oh my God! What? How is this not a major, major thing? How are Mozilla and Google not pushing hard for government CAs to have these, like, stat? And for OpenSSL to actually check them?

I am bewildered. What happened? Is this just apathy?

http://blog.codekills.net/2012/04/08/adventures-in-x509-the-...

Unbelievable. This is SRV for HTTP all over again. The Betamax of the 21st century.


Enforcement of nameConstraints is inconsistent at best.

I experimented with name constraints a couple years ago for a private CA project, with the idea that I could restrict the private CA to issuing only names within a chosen subdomain.

I remember being able to enforce nameConstraints on the subjectAltName, but I was never able to get it to enforce anything on the subject Common Name. In theory new certificates should always have a critical subjectAltName extension, but this makes it worthless in practice.

It's also possible that my X.509 foo is not strong enough, or that I was testing with an older version of OpenSSL that doesn't implement it.

http://blog.codekills.net/2012/04/08/adventures-in-x509-the-...




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